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Following from Woodford’s derivation of a benevolent monetary policy maker’s objective
function from agents utility, a number of papers have suggested that policy in an open
economy should have the same objectives as in a closed economy, and in particular that the
exchange rate should play no role. We show that this conclusion is not robust to the presence
of any shocks to International Risk Sharing. When such shocks are important, the exchange
rate appears alongside output and inﬂation in the social welfare function. However the form
of this target is rather diﬀerent from that used by a number of authors.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Woodford (2003), following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), showed that by taking a second
order expansion of a representative agent’s utility it was possible to derive a benevolent monetary
policy maker’s objective function, which took the traditional form involving quadratic terms in
inﬂation and the output gap. This microfounding of a social welfare function has been rapidly
adopted in the literature. Some recent papers have extended the analysis to an open economy,
and reached the conclusion that the form of the social welfare function remains unchanged. For
example, Aoki (2002) considers a two sector model, where prices in one sector are completely
ﬂexible, and shows that it is only inﬂa t i o ni nt h en o n - ﬂexible sector that is relevant for welfare.
He explicitly suggests that imported goods in an open economy are akin to the ﬂexible price
sector, and that therefore the price of imported goods (and by implication the exchange rate)
should not appear in the inﬂation measure representing welfare. Gali and Monacelli (2002)
consider a small open economy and come to the same conclusion, although the result is only
demonstrated in the special case where utility functions are logarithmic. Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2001) use the same model, and suggest that this result holds for any constant elasticity
formulation of the utility functions. In all cases the exchange rate does not enter the benevolent
policy maker’s objective function.
In this paper we show that this result will no longer hold once we allow for one important
source of distortionary shocks, which are deviations away from international risk sharing or
uncovered interest parity. Once we allow for these shocks, inﬂation and the output gap are
no longer suﬃcient to summarise aggregate welfare, and there is a role for a terms of trade or
exchange rate term as well. While some authors have experimented with including the exchange
rate alongside inﬂation and output as monetary policy targets (e.g. Kollmann (2002)), as far as
we are aware none have used the exchange rate in the form suggested by our welfare analysis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline the model we use. We
show how international risk sharing or uncovered interest parity shocks mean that the output
gap and consumption gap can move in diﬀerent directions. In Section 3 we derive a second
order expansion of the model’s represent agents utility function, and show how this introduces
a role for the exchange rate gap alongside the output gap in the social welfare function. Section
4 summarises the analysis. In the main text we try and focus on the economics behind our
analysis, and full algebraic derivations are given in an appendix.
2 Deriving the Model
Our model is of a small open economy, and represents a simple extension to the model outlined
in Gali and Monacelli (2002) and used in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). The model involves
1the following key elements. There is no capital or government expenditure. There are two
types of consumption good; those produced domestically and overseas. The law of one price
holds for any particular good. Firms are monopolistically competitive, which on its own would
mean that aggregate output is permanently below eﬃcient levels, but the government can set a
subsidy to eliminate this distortion in steady state. Prices are set according to Calvo contracts,
which generates an aggregate externality that is responsible for business cycles. The benevolent
monetary policy maker sets interest rates to counteract this distortion. Following the literature,
we describe the ‘natural’ level of variables as the level that would occur in the absence of nominal
inertia.
Our focus in this section is to derive equations in terms of ﬁrst order log linear deviations from
steady state. (In deriving our expression for welfare, we will in fact need second order expansions
for some of these equations, but their derivation is given in an appendix.) We will examine the
conditions under which the output gap, that is deviations in output from its natural level, fully
describes similar gaps for other variables. This question is crucial for assessing whether the
exchange rate has an independent role in inﬂuencing social welfare.
2.1 Home and Foreign goods







βs−t[u(Cs,ξ s) − v(ys(z),ξ s)] (1)
where C is consumption, y is output for good z, ξ is a taste shock, and β is a discount rate. We
generalise Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) by including preference shocks and not specifying
the functional form of the utility function1. The advantage of the former is that it allows us to
focus more precisely on when exchange rate movements may have implications for welfare. The
advantage of the latter is that it strongly motivates deriving second order approximations to wel-
fare. (The function v(·) embodies both the disutility of labour and the production technology.).
The aggregate consumption bundle is given by













where CH and CF are indices of consumption of domest i ca n df o r e i g ng o o d s ,a n dw ed r o pt h e
time subscript wherever all variables are dated at t. The parameter α is related to the share of
imported goods in domestic consumption. In turn



















,  > 1 (3)





























The optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and foreign goods implies, given the
law of one price











where the consumer price index (CPI) is
















2.2 Terms of trade and real exchange rate





















We also assume a symmetric equilibrium and that the second economy is large, so that
P∗
F = P∗ (12)
Y ∗ = C∗ (13)
32.3 Intertemporal optimisation
Each household faces the same ﬂow budget constraint:
PtCt + Et[Rt,t+1Bt+1] ≤ Bt + WtNt + Tt (14)
where Bt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ in period t +1of a portfolio held at the end of period t, R is
a stochastic discount factor for nominal payoﬀs, W is the nominal wage, N labour supply and




Together with transversality conditions, the budget constraint can be solved forward to yield:
∞ X
s=t



















= −βs−tvh(ys,ξ s)+λRt,sWs =0 (15)
∂L
∂Cs
= βs−tuC(Cs,ξ s) − λRt,sPs =0 (16)

















Log-linearising the deﬁnition of consumer prices around a steady state where PH = PF gives
ˆ P =( 1− α) ˆ PH + α ˆ PF = ˆ PH + αˆ S (19)
where for any variable x, ˆ x denotes log-linear deviations from steady state. Denoting inﬂation
as πt+1 =l n ( Pt+1/Pt),t h e nw ec a na l s ow r i t e
4π = πH + α∆ˆ S (20)
where π is CPI inﬂation, and πH output price inﬂation. Using the ﬁrst order expansion







and a similar expression for vy allows us to derive





































The left hand side of (22) is the real consumer wage. Note that with logarithmic utility, which
is the case considered by Gali and Monacelli (2002), we have σ =1 ,ψ= −1,g= h =0 .
To derive a log-linearised demand curve for home goods, note that these goods are either
consumed at home or abroad, so that
Y = CH + C∗
H (28)
ˆ Y =( 1− α) ˆ CH + α ˆ C∗
H (29)
to ﬁrst order. From the demand curve we have
ˆ CH − ˆ C = −η( ˆ PH − ˆ P)=ηαˆ S (30)
We can write a similar relationship for foreign consumers:
5ˆ C∗
H − ˆ C∗ = −η( ˆ P∗
H − ˆ P∗) (31)
A st h er e s to ft h ew o r l di sl a r g e ,C∗ = Y ∗ and P∗ = PF, so output is given by
ˆ Y =( 1− α)( ˆ C + ηαˆ S)+α(ˆ Y ∗ + ηˆ S) (32)
= αˆ Y ∗ +( 1− α) ˆ C + αη(2 − α)ˆ S
where we ignore second order or higher terms. Thus the demand for domestic output depends
on domestic consumption, world output and the real exchange rate.
2.4 Price setting
Price setting follows the usual Calvo set-up with 1−γ of ﬁrms changing price in a given period.
The log-linear pricing rule for prices changed in period t is given by,




where µ =l o g ( ε
ε−1) is the gross mark-up in the steady-state, and mc are nominal marginal costs.
The following log-linear approximation
πH,t =( 1− γ)(˜ pH,t − pH,t−1) (34)
allows us to write (set pH,t−1 = pH,t−πH,t to obtain an equation for γπH,t and subtract βγπH,t+1)
πH,t = βEt[πH,t+1]+
(1 − γ)(1 − βγ)
γ
c mct (35)
This is a Phillips curve of the ‘New Keynesian’ type. Real marginal costs c mc are given by
c mc = ˆ W − ˆ PH (36)
and, ﬁnally, the linear Phillips curve can be written as (see Appendix A.3, formula (79)):
πH,t = βπH,t+1 +
ψ(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
















62.5 International risk sharing



























which is Uncovered Interest Parity when 1
1+it = E[Rt,t+1] and 1
1+i∗
t = E[R∗
t,t+1].W e w a n t t o
introduce a distortion , such that
 tζt






where ζt is the distortionary shock. The reason for adding such shocks is straightforward.
One argument that is frequently invoked in favour of exchange rate targeting (and its limit,
monetary union) is that markets often drive the exchange rate well away from levels implied by
fundamentals, and that this has damaging eﬀects on the economy as a whole. (For example,
see Buiter and Grafe (2003) in evidence submitted to the U.K. Treasury enquiry into joining
EMU.) The empirical importance of distortions to uncovered interest parity are discussed in
Kollmann (2003) and Kollmann (2002). It is therefore important to investigate whether these
shocks introduce a role for the exchange rate in the welfare function, and what form that might













where Q i st h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ed e ﬁned above. By integrating we can show that home con-
sumption will be related to world consumption, the real exchange rate, and the international
risk sharing (IRS) distortion. A ﬁrst order linearised version, which assumes that ξ and ξ∗ are
identical2,i sg i v e nb y
ˆ Ct = ˆ Y ∗
t + σ(1 − α)ˆ St − σˆ ζt + O(2) (42)
2Departures from this assumption would add terms similar to ζ, but a key distinction is that ζ is distortionary
while ξ reﬂects preferences.
72.6 Gap variables
Equations (42) and (32) represent a two equation system involving three endogenous variables
(output, consumption and the terms of trade), one exogenous variable (world output) and the
IRS shock. The latter is a distortion, and so it is appropriate to deﬁne the natural level of a
variable as the level that would occur in the absence of this distortion as well as nominal inertia.
We can therefore derive the following two equations in terms of ‘gaps’ i.e. the diﬀerence between
actual and natural deviations from steady state.
ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t =( 1− α)( ˆ Ct − ˆ Cn
t )+αη(2 − α)(ˆ St − ˆ Sn
t )
ˆ Ct − ˆ Cn
t = σ(1 − α)(ˆ St − ˆ Sn
t ) − σˆ ζt
where the superscript n denotes natural levels, and we ignore terms of order two or more.
If ˆ ζt =0 , as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), then these two equations allow us to express
both the consumption and terms of trade gaps as proportionate to the output gap to ﬁrst order.
We only need to know what the output gap is to know exactly what the other two gaps will be,
so if these other gaps appear in any expression for social welfare, we can always replace them
by terms in the output gap. However, once we allow for an international risk sharing distortion,
this will no longer be the case. Such a shock may generate a terms of trade or consumption
gap, yet the output gap could be zero. As we shall now show, this is crucial in establishing a
potential role for the exchange rate in a social welfare function.
3S o c i a l W e l f a r e w i t h I R S s h o c k s
Following Woodford’s analysis (Woodford (2003)), there are now a large number of papers that
derive policy makers objective functions explicitly from consumers’ utility (besides those cited
above, other examples are Sutherland (2002a) , Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2003), De Paoli
(2004) and Pappa (2002)). Rather than assume and evaluate some speciﬁc and arbitrary intra-
period utility function, the analysis aims to present a second-order approximation of a general
function, which would include only known parameters, including some shape characteristics like
risk-aversion. In the analysis below we try and focus on the economics behind this derivation,
leaving the detailed maths to an appendix.
A benevolent policy maker will attempt to maximise the utility of all workers, and so will





Taking a second order approximation of (43) around the steady state, and dropping the common
time subscript for clarity, gives

































where Vz denotes the variance across goods, and tip(3) represents terms that are independent of
policy (i.e. terms involving the steady state or shocks alone) and terms higher than second order
(see Appendix B). The ﬁrst two terms come from the utility of consumption, and represent the
costs of aggregate consumption deviating from its optimal path. The next two terms represent
similar magnitudes for labour supply and hence output, while the ﬁnal term represents costs
associated with the output of individual goods diﬀering from average output.
As Woodford (2003) shows, the term in the variance of output across producers exists because
of the distortion due to Calvo contracts and can be replaced with a quadratic term in inﬂation.
(The derivation for our model is exactly the same, so there is little point in repeating it here.)
With nominal inertia in the form of Calvo contracts, the only reason for output of individual
goods to diﬀer is that some ﬁrms change their prices while others do not. The greater is inﬂation,
the larger the movement in relative prices, and therefore the larger the variance in output across
goods. This is a particularly clear representation of one of the standard arguments for costs
associated with inﬂation: that higher inﬂation is associated with a greater distortion in relative
prices, and therefore a larger misallocation of production and labour across goods. However
it also apparent from this derivation that it is only the relative price of domestically produced
goods, and therefore output price inﬂation, that is relevant for welfare, because only domestic
goods are involved in domestic labour supply. To put this another way, inﬂa t i o no n l ym a t t e r s
to agents as workers, not as consumers. The exchange rate therefore has no ‘direct’ role in this
inﬂation measure.
What about the remaining terms? These involve either output or consumption (and the
preference shock), so in this very basic sense there is no role for the exchange rate or the terms
of trade. However the welfare function in this form is not very useful to policy makers for two
reasons. First, it involves terms in the preference shock, which may not be known. Second, it
is unclear what relationship this expression has to more conventional linear quadratic objective
functions. Both problems can potentially be resolved by utilising the results of individual agents
optimising behaviour. In doing this, we want to focus on two key issues. First, can the terms
in consumption be replaced by terms in output alone, or will we also require terms in the terms
of trade? Second, does the analysis imply that the policy maker should attempt to achieve the
9ﬂex-price equilibrium, which would be the case if welfare could be written as quadratic terms in
gaps alone.
These issues can be examined most transparently if we split the welfare expression into four
groups, where the fourth involves the terms in the variance across goods already discussed. The
ﬁrst group, which we denote by WL, involves only linear terms in consumption and output:
ceteris paribus more consumption is good, and more labour supply is bad:
WL = UcC ˆ C − Yv y ˆ Y (45)
An obvious question is whether, by using the work/leisure trade-oﬀ involved in agents optimi-
sation, we can eliminate these terms? In a closed economy, C = Y and ˆ C = ˆ Y , but in general
it will not be the case that Uc = vy, because of the monopolistic distortion. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) sidestepped this problem by assuming a production subsidy that exactly oﬀset
the impact of monopoly production, ensuring that WL =0 . In the main text we follow this
route for our open economy. More recently Sutherland (2002b) and Benigno and Woodford
(2004) have used an alternative procedure, which involves using a second order approximation
of the Phillips curve. This approach is only valid under particular policies3. We consider this
approach in the Appendix, and ﬁnd that our key results also apply in this case.
In an open economy, we can use (32) and (42) to write














((2 − α)+σ(1 − α)) ˆ S ˆ C + tip(3)
and Φ is a combination of model parameters (see Appendix B for details). ˆ X involves terms of
order two and will not disappear even for logarithmic utility4.N o t et h a ta l t h o u g h ˆ X involves
only terms of order two, it does imply that in general the relationship between output and
consumption will be inﬂuenced by changes in exogenous world demand or preference shocks.
Substituting this into the expression for WL implies
WL = UcC(Φˆ Y + ˆ X) − Yv y ˆ Y + tip(3)
= ˆ Y (UcCΦ − Yv y)+UcC ˆ X + tip(3) (48)
3Sutherland (2002b) considers some particular rules for the money supply and Benigno and Woodford (2004)
derive results for the timeless-perspective policy only.
4Only in the very special case, with log-utility σ =1 , and with η =1 , and without shocks, ˆ X will disappear,
see Gali and Monacelli (2002).
10The second group of terms from the welfare function involve the preference shock:
WS = −UcC ˆ C
g
σ




Note that in the special case of log utility, we have g = h =0 ,s oWS =0 . Once again we have
terms in output and consumption. Using the relationship above implies
WS = −UcC(Φˆ Y + ˆ X)
g
σ
ˆ ξ − Yv y ˆ Y
h
ψ
ˆ ξ + tip(3)







In this case the terms in ˆ X, which are all order two or above, are multiplied by the preference
shock, so they can be absorbed into the tip(3) term.
We can then use (22) to replace ˆ ξ by terms in natural variables. Recall that the natural level
of a variable is the level that would occur if there was no nominal inertia or IRS distortion. In
our model, natural variables will depend on ˆ ξ and ˆ Y ∗ alone. The mark up (wages over output
prices) is unaﬀected by changes in ˆ ξ and ˆ Y ∗ (with ﬂexible prices, it depends on the degree of
monopoly together with any output subsidy), so we can write to ﬁrst order
ˆ yn 1
ψ
+ ˆ Cn 1
σ







We can use this expression to substitute out for the preference shock in WS.( A sˆ ξ is multiplied
by ˆ Y , we can ignore second order terms in the equation above.) Before doing this, let us write













)ˆ Y 2] (52)
In the special case of logarithmic utility, we have σ =1 ,ψ= −1,s oWQ =0 .
We can now use the results of agents optimisation to simplify these three components of
welfare. We noted that, in a closed economy, we could assume a subsidy such that Uc = vy ,
which set WL =0. The obvious analogy for an open economy is to set the subsidy such that




ˆ X + tip(3) (53)
WS = Yv y ˆ Y (ˆ yn 1
ϕ
+ ˆ Cn 1
σ
+ αˆ Sn)+tip(3)
= Yv y(ˆ ynˆ Y
1
ϕ
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)ˆ Y 2] (55)
11noting that natural variables are also tip. Now note that
(ˆ Y − ˆ Y n)2 = ˆ Y 2 − 2ˆ Y ˆ Y n + tip (56)
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)ˆ Y ˆ Y n]+tip
Combining this with WS gives
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)(ˆ Y − ˆ Y n)2 +2 αˆ Snˆ Y +2ˆ Y (ˆ Y n − ˆ Cn)] + tip(3)
(In the closed economy case, Φ =1and α =0 , so this simpliﬁes to just a quadratic term in the
output/consumption gap.) We can then add in the ﬁrst component to give









)( ˆ C − ˆ Cn)2 − (1 +
1
ψ
)(ˆ Y − ˆ Y n)2 (59)
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((2 − α)+σ(1 − α)) ˆ Sn
¶
ˆ C + tip(3)
We can now see that, in an open economy, welfare cannot be expressed in terms of gap
variables alone. The minimum value for welfare will not in general be the point in which output
and consumption gaps are zero. This is because the size of the monopolistic distortion in an
open economy depends on changes in exogenous variables or preference shocks, which in turn
inﬂuence the value of natural variables. While a constant subsidy can eliminate the monopolistic
distortion for ˆ Y ∗ = ˆ ξ =0 , it cannot do so for any other combination except by chance. To achieve
this would require a subsidy that was conditional on these terms. (This point that has been
noted by Beningno and Benigno (2003) in a related context.)
12We can now turn to the other question we needed to address, which was whether the welfare
expression can only be written in terms of output alone. As we noted at the end of the previous
section, the consumption and output gaps will only move together when the IRS distortion is
absent i.e. ˆ ζ =0 . Only in this special case (which is implicitly the case considered by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2001)) will it be possible to express welfare as a function of a single gap term.
However, it is possible to substitute out the consumption gap in terms of the output gap and
the terms of trade gap. The Appendix shows that we can obtain an expression for total welfare
of the form5
W = CuC{A1(ˆ Y − ˆ Y n)2 + A2(ˆ S − ˆ Sn)2 + A3(ˆ S − ˆ Sn)(ˆ Y − ˆ Y n) (60)
+ ˆ S(A41ˆ Y n + A42 ˆ Sn + A45ˆ Y ∗)
+ ˆ Y (A51ˆ Y n + A52 ˆ Sn + A55ˆ Y ∗)+A6π2
H} + tip(3)
Thus we can reduce the policy problem to one involving gaps in two variables, output and the
t e r m so ft r a d e ,p l u si n ﬂation, but where quadratic gap terms are accompanied by linear gap
terms multiplying natural values.6 The appendix also shows that we obtain a similar structure
utilising the approach of Sutherland (2002b) and Benigno and Woodford (2004). A similar
expression is stated in De Paoli (2004). Although the model has some similarities to ours, the
IRS distortion is missing, there are no preference shocks and no derivation is provided.
The quadratic gap terms arise partly from WQ, but also because of second order terms in
the demand or international risk sharing equations entering through WL. Thus, terms in the
exchange rate gap arise even in the special case of log utility. Given the demand curve, it would
of course also be possible to write an expression in the output and consumption gaps, without
any term in the exchange rate gap. However, while policy has some experience in targeting the
exchange rate, there are few examples where policy has explicitly targeted a consumption gap.
A key point to note about the terms of trade term is that, like output, it is in the form
of deviations from the natural level i.e. the terms of trade that would occur with no nominal
inertia or IRS shocks. A number of studies have experimented with simple feedback rules which
include some form of exchange rate targeting, but generally not in terms of deviations from its
natural level. For example, Kollmann (2002) ﬁnds that adding a quadratic term in the change
in exchange rate to a feedback rule (with optimised parameters) that already includes output
price inﬂation and output disequilibrium terms adds virtually nothing to welfare.7 This result
5It would, of course, be trivially possible to redeﬁne gap variables such that it was no longer related to natural
level, but was a function of other disturbances (ˆ Y
n, ˆ S
n, ˆ Y
∗) as well. Formula (60) would contain the same
quadratic terms, but would not contain linear terms, as in Benigno and Woodford (2004). The standard meaning
of gaps would be lost in this case.
6Experiments with some alternative calibrations suggest that the magnitude of A2 is less than A1, but still
signiﬁcant, particularly bearing in mind that exchange rates are more volatile than output.
7In Kollmann (2003), it is argued that exchange rate targeting may be of greater value if it helps reduce the
13is interesting, because CPI inﬂation targeting can be roughly ‘recovered’ from separate terms
on output price inﬂation and the change in the exchange rate. However our analysis suggests
terms in exchange rate ‘gap’: the diﬀerence between actual exchange rate disequilibrium and the
disequilibrium that would occur with no distortions. Not only is the dimension of this expression
diﬀerent from the change in the exchange rate, but a change in exchange rate term makes no
attempt to allow for ‘warranted’ exchange rate movements i.e. natural disequilibrium.8
One early example that does come close to trying to capture the concept of an exchange
rate gap is the Target Zone proposal of Williamson and Miller (Williamson and Miller (1987),
see also Currie and Wren-Lewis (1989) for an evaluation), where interest rates diﬀerentials were
assigned entirely to stabilising the real exchange rate around its medium term equilibrium level
(FEER), and ﬁscal policy was assigned to inﬂation stabilisation. While this particular policy
assignment may no longer be on the agenda (except, perhaps, for countries within a currency
union), the FEER measure of an equilibrium exchange rate is close to the idea of a natural
level. In particular, the FEER is the real exchange rate that would occur if the economy was in
‘internal balance’, which can be interpreted as abstracting from business cycle eﬀects generated
by nominal inertia as well as IRS shocks. Crucially the FEER is inﬂuenced by medium term
net saving (private or public), which can be thought of as one example of a preference shock. In
this sense the FEER is more like the natural level of the real exchange rate than PPP.
It is important, however, to recognise that our analysis does not imply that policy should
always aim to eliminate exchange rate gaps. Some exchange rate gap may well be necessary to
avoid large output gaps. Typically a tight monetary policy, responding to a positive output gap,
will lead to an appreciation, which will a helpful element in the transmission mechanism. Where
the exchange rate gap term plays an essential role is if a positive demand shock is combined with
an excess appreciation as a result of some distortion to international risk sharing or uncovered
interest parity. In this case the appreciation may eliminate the impact of the demand shock on
the output gap, but a consumption gap would remain, and so a cut in interest rates to moderate
the appreciation will enhance welfare.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have examined the proposition in some recent papers that the objective function
of a benevolent monetary policy maker in an open economy is identical to that for a closed
economy. We have shown that this is no longer the case once we introduce a wider range of
shocks into the model. Such shocks introduce a potential role for the terms of trade or exchange
size of IRS shocks.
8For this reason CPI inﬂation targeting cannot be considered as an attempt to combine the output price
inﬂation targeting and exchange rate targeting in this welfare framework.
14rate gap in the objective function alongside the output gap and output price inﬂation. This is an
important result, because it shows for the ﬁrst time why the central bank should be concerned
with exchange rate disequilibria as well as output disequilibria because both impact directly on
agents’ utility.9 The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Unless there are no shocks
to international risk sharing or uncovered interest parity, output gaps and consumption gaps
may not move together. Welfare depends on both gaps. If central banks do not monitor the
consumption gap directly, then they need to consider the exchange rate gap alongside the output
gap in setting policy.
9Currie and Wren-Lewis (1989) place an exchange rate disequilibrium (from the FEER) term in an objective
function, but their informal justiﬁcation was rather diﬀerent. They argued that this term could capture costs
due to dispersion in traded/non-traded acticity. In the model in our paper all ﬁrms trade equally, so this issue
does not arise, but it would be interesting to formally derive social welfare functions in models that did make this
distinction.
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17A Second order approximation to key economic relationships
A.1 Risk Sharing Condition

























where the real exchange rate Qt is deﬁned in (11). Assuming some initial conditions ϑ we can
iterate (62) and obtain (Gali and Monacelli (2002)):
uC(C∗
t ,ξ t)φ(ζt)=ϑQtuC(Ct,ξ t) (63)
The second order linearisation yields:
uC(Ci









+ d ˆ Csˆ ξs)+o(Cs,ξ s)2
uC(C∗i
















Therefore, we substitute these relationships into (63) and, using uC(C∗,1) = ϑQuC(C,1),
obtain the following relationship, where all terms of order higher than two are eliminated:
ˆ Cs = ˆ C∗























s + ˆ C∗
s ˆ ζs + gˆ ξ∗




s + d ˆ C∗
s ˆ ξ∗
s
the linear version of which is
ˆ Cs = ˆ C∗
s + σ ˆ Qt − σˆ ζs − g(ˆ ξs − ˆ ξ∗
s)
It is convenient to write down the formula in terms of trade, rather than real exchange rate.














= S((1 − α)+αS(1−η))
− 1
1−η
Linearisation up to second order terms yields:
ˆ Q =l nQ =l n ( S((1 − α)+αS(1−η))
− 1
1−η)=( 1− α)ˆ S +
1
2
(1 − α)(α(η − 1) − 1)ˆ S2 (65)
18So we can rewrite (64) as:
ˆ Cs = ˆ C∗
s + σ(1 − α)ˆ S +
1
2



















s + ˆ C∗
s ˆ ζs + gˆ ξ∗




s + d ˆ C∗
s ˆ ξ∗
s




Y = CH + C∗
H (67)



























On the other hand,
C = CH + CF (68)
and linearisation gives:













ˆ Ys = ˆ C + α(( ˆ C∗





H − ˆ C∗2) − ( ˆ C2







ˆ Y 2 + α ˆ C∗ − α ˆ C + α
1
2




From (6) it follows
ˆ C∗
H − ˆ C∗ = −η(P∗
H − P∗), ˆ CF − ˆ C = −η(PF − P)
ˆ PH − ˆ P = −αˆ S, ˆ PF − ˆ P =( 1− α)ˆ S, ˆ P∗
H − ˆ P∗ = −α∗ ˆ S ≈−ˆ S (69)
19and
ˆ Ys =( 1− α) ˆ C + α ˆ C∗ + αη(2 − α)ˆ S +
1
2
η2α2(2 − α)ˆ S2 (70)
+ αηˆ S ˆ C∗ + αη(1 − α)ˆ S ˆ C +
1
2
(1 − α) ˆ C2 −
1
2




where the linear version can be written as:
ˆ Ys =( 1− α) ˆ C + α ˆ C∗ + αη(2 − α)ˆ S (71)
Again, formula (70) assumes no restrictions on the form of utility function and the model
parameters.
A.3 Phillips Curve
As it is shown in Woodford (2003), the problem of proﬁt maximisation for the private sector



















which is an equation for price determination.
H e r e ,w ea s s u m ea niso-elastic form of both components of the household utility function.



















































Note that for iso-elastic utility
σd+ g =0 (75)
20This assumption allows us to derive optimal price as an explicit function of all other parameters.











































































































































































  + ψ
.
The only diﬀerence from Benigno and Woodford (2004) is that we distinguish PH,t and Pt.





t =( 1− γβ)Et
∞ X
s=t






































( ˆ Ft − ˆ Kt)( ˆ Ft + ˆ Kt)
where, by deﬁnition of ks,t and fs,t :






























ˆ ks,t + ˆ fs,t =[ 1− (
1
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= ω(1 − γβ)Et
∞ X
s=t
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1
ψ















(γβ)s−t(Xs +[ 1− (
1
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(γβ)s−t(Xs +[ 1− (
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(γβ)s−t(Xs +[ 1− (
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γβ[1 − ( 1




























πH,t = βπH,t+1 +





























It is clear that the ﬁrst-order approximation to the price-setting equation can be written as
a conventional Phillips curve:
πH,t = βπH,t+1 + κzt (79)
where
κ =
ω(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
γ
=
ψ(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
(  + ψ)γ
Denote











then we can rewrite (78) as











This formula is convenient for our future derivations, but we still need to deﬁne zt and Xt in




= −αˆ S +
1
2
α(η − 1)(1 − α) ˆ S2














)ˆ ξt + αˆ St−
1
2














)ˆ ξt − αˆ St +
1
2
















23B Second Order Approximation to Utility
Expanding U(Cs,ξ s) around U(C,1) gives













C ˆ Csˆ ξs + tip(3) (82)





































ˆ y(z)ˆ ξ]dz + tip(3) (84)








+ Vzˆ y(z)] +
h
ψ
ˆ ξsEzˆ y(z)] + tip(3)
where the expectation Ezx =
R
xdz and the variance Vz =
R
(x − Ezx)2 =
R
x2dz − Exx.









where   is the elasticity of demand. Taking a Taylor expansion of this yields







We can use this to eliminate terms in Ezˆ y(z),n o t i n gt h a t( Ezˆ y(z))2 = ˆ Y 2 + O(|ξ|)3,a n dt h a t
Vzˆ y(z)ˆ ξ is O(3).T h i sg i v e s
Z 1
0







































24We can now combine the two calculations to give




































This is equation (44) in the main text, but with time subscripts included.
Until now, these manipulations have only used one model property, which was the deﬁnition
of the output index from the demand curve. As such, the analysis so far also applies to a closed
economy, and is identical to that in Woodford (2003) and Steinsson (2002). We have four types
of term in this expression: those involving level deviations in C and Y , those combining these
deviations with shocks, quadratic terms in deviations in C and Y , and a term in the variance
of output across goods. This last term can be related to the variance of individual prices using







(which comes from adding consumption across home and overseas) it follows that with Calvo
contracts this term can be represented as inﬂation squared (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)):
Vzˆ y(z)= 2Vxˆ p(z)=
 2γ




























(ψ +  ) γ
ψ(1 − γβ)(1− γ)
π2
H,t]+tip(3)
Deﬁne ‘natural’ variables as values that would occur without the nominal inertia and inter-
national risk sharing distortions. All natural variables will be a function of ˆ ξ and ˆ Y ∗,w o r l d
output disequilibrium. With price ﬂexibility and a constant output subsidy, the mark-up over
marginal costs will be constant, so from (22) we can write to ﬁrst order
0=[ ˆ yn 1
ψ
+ ˆ Cn 1
σ







25An identical expression occurs in the closed economy, except that the term in S obviously
disappears.



























)] + tip(3) (93)
and so we can eliminate the terms in ˆ ξ to give
Wclosed




































)( ˆ Cs − ˆ Cn










The second line notes the relationship between ˆ C2 and ˆ C ˆ Cn to simplify in terms of the ‘con-
sumption gap’ ˆ C− ˆ Cn, bearing in mind that terms in ˆ Cn alone can be added to tip. Thus policy
can increase welfare in two ways: by reducing the variance of output (across goods) and keeping
output/consumption close to its natural level.
In an open economy we use the same procedure. Here, ˆ C 6= ˆ Y so we cannot eliminate linear
terms immediately, but instead we use second-order approximation to risk-sharing condition and
aggregate demand.
A second order expansion of the aggregate demand curve was derived in (70)
ˆ Y =( 1− α) ˆ C + α ˆ C∗ + αη(2 − α)ˆ S +
1
2
η2α2(2 − α)ˆ S2 (95)
+ αηˆ S ˆ C∗ + αη(1 − α)ˆ S ˆ C +
1
2
(1 − α) ˆ C2 −
1
2




while a second order expansion of the risk sharing condition (assuming ˆ ξ∗
s = ˆ ξs)i m p l i e s
ˆ C = σ(1 − α)ˆ S −
1
2
b ˆ C2 +
1
2
σα(1 − α)(η − 2) ˆ S2 (96)
− d ˆ Cˆ ξ − (1 − α) ˆ C ˆ S − (1 − α)g ˆ Sˆ ξ + ˆ Y ∗










σˆ ζ2 + ˆ C∗ˆ ζ + gˆ ξ∗ˆ ζ +
1
2
gaˆ ξ∗2 + d ˆ C∗ˆ ξ∗
and σ and g are deﬁned in (73)-(74). These two equations can be solved for ˆ C and ˆ S :
ˆ C = Φˆ Y +( 1− Φ) ˆ Y ∗ − Φ
ηα(2 − α)
σ(1 − α)


























ˆ Y 2 + Φ(ˆ ζ +
g
σ
(ˆ ξ − ˆ ξ∗)) −
Φ
σ(1 − α)
















(1 − α − αη)
σ
ˆ C ˆ S − Φ
ηα
σ(1 − α)







where we used the ﬁrst-order approximation








(b(2 − α)ηα+ σ(1 − α)2)
(100)
For iso-elastic utility (d +
g
σ =0 ) ˆ Sˆ ξ disappears:
ˆ C = Φˆ Y +
1
2






− Φαη ˆ S ˆ Y ∗ − Φ
αη
σ
((2 − α)+σ(1 − α)) ˆ S ˆ C + tip
For future reference, the ﬁrst order expansion is:
ˆ C = Φˆ Y +( 1− Φ) ˆ Y ∗ − Φ
ηα(2 − α)
σ(1 − α)
(σˆ ζ + g(ˆ ξ − ˆ ξ∗)) (102)





































ˆ Ys − Φα2η(2 − α)ˆ S2


















































ˆ Ys. In what follows, we show how to
bring this formula into a form that contains only quadratic terms. Two approaches have been
27advanced in the literature. The ﬁrst adds a subsidy that should be paid to producers in order
to remove monopolistic distortions. This we consider in Section B.1. Alternatively, we can use
one of remaining equations, the Phillips curve, and try to express output as a function of other
economic variables and substitute it in formula (103). This is discussed in Section B.2.
B.1 Using subsidy to eliminate linear terms
We can assume a subsidy that changes the markup µ such that 1






−Φα2η(2 − α)ˆ S2



















ˆ Ysˆ ξs − 1
2Φ 1









 + tip(3) (104)





















allows us to replace the quadratic terms in the consumption gap in the welfare function:
Ws = −Uc(·)CΦ

   



























σ ((2 − α)+σ(1 − α))
³
ˆ Ss − ˆ Sn
s
´³






























   
    

+tip(3)
From the linear approximation to aggregate demand (71) we express ˆ C as function of ˆ Y,ˆ Y ∗
and ˆ S, substitute it into (104) and rewrite it as:
Ws = Uc(·)CΦ

        



















−σ (1 − α)






















ˆ Ysˆ ξs + 1
2
((1−α)2−ηα(2−α))








        
   

+ tip(3)
using the expression for ˆ ξ in terms of natural rates again, we get:
Ws = Uc(·)C{A1
³
ˆ Ys − ˆ Y n
s
´2
+ A2(ˆ Ss − ˆ Sn
s )2 + A3(ˆ Ss − ˆ Sn
s )
³
ˆ Ys − ˆ Y n
s
´
+ ˆ Ss(A41ˆ Y n
s + A42 ˆ Sn
s + A45ˆ Y ∗
s )
+ ˆ Ys(A51ˆ Y n
s + A52 ˆ Sn

























(2 − α)η((1 − α)
2 2σ (1 − α)(1− η)−(2 − α)η
³
(1 − α)












,A 41 = −Φ
ηα
³
σ (1 − α)









(2 − α)ηα2(αη2 (2 − α)
2 +( 1− α)










,A 51 = Φ
ηα(2 − α)






(αη2 (2 − α)








(ψ +  ) γ
ψ(1 − γβ)(1− γ)
B.2 Using Phillips Curve to eliminate linear terms
In this Section’s derivations we closely follow Benigno and Woodford (2004). Our notation is
made as close to theirs as possible. We make an assumption that our utility is iso-elastic, as
this substantially simpliﬁes derivations.
As discussed above, our task is to eliminate the remaining linear terms in (103) without
using a subsidy to producers. Instead, it was suggested by Sutherland (2002b) and illustrated
by Benigno and Woodford (2004), to use one of remaining equations, Phillips curve. However,
the Phillips curve is a dynamic relationship, and by using it, we eliminate unnecessary linear
terms from the utility representation, but introduce dynamic structure.
We have previously derived (81) which depends on zt + 1
2ztXt. We now derive zt + 1
2ztXt
in terms of conventional variables. To do so we use second-order approximations to the risk
sharing equation and aggregate demand (70) and (66). These relationships can be solved to
yield the term of trade ˆ S and consumption ˆ C (98) and (97). Using the linear approximation:
ˆ C =( 1
(1−α)
ˆ Y − α
(1−α)
ˆ Y ∗ −
αη(2−α)
(1−α)
ˆ S) we can get rid out of ˆ C in the RHS of both (97) and
(98). The obtained expressions will contain two terms, involving ˆ ξ : ˆ Sˆ ξ and ˆ Y ˆ ξ. We can use
ˆ S =(ˆ Y − ˆ Y ∗ +( 1− α)(σˆ ζ + g(ˆ ξ − ˆ ξ∗)))/(αη(2 − α)+σ(1 − α)2) to substitute into ˆ Sˆ ξ in order
to have only one term with ˆ ξ : ˆ Y ˆ ξ. By assuming the iso-elastic version we eliminate it as well
and end up with10:
10For an iso-elastic function, equality (75) is used.
29ˆ C = cY ˆ Y + cX ˆ Y ∗ + cZ(σˆ ζ + g(ˆ ξ − ˆ ξ∗)) (106)
+ cYYˆ Y 2 + cSS ˆ S2 + cXY ˆ Y ∗ˆ Y + cSY ˆ S ˆ Y + cSX ˆ S ˆ Y ∗
ˆ S = sY ˆ Y + sX ˆ Y ∗ + sZ(σˆ ζ + g(ˆ ξ − ˆ ξ∗)) (107)
+ sYYˆ Y 2 + sSS ˆ S2 + sXY ˆ Y ∗ˆ Y + sSY ˆ S ˆ Y + sSX ˆ S ˆ Y ∗
where:





















3 σ2 (−ση(1 − α)
2 (2(2 − α)+σ (4 − 3α))
− 2σ2 (1 − α)
3 + αη2 (2 − α)
2),
cXY = Φ
(σ2(1 − α)2 − (2 − α)ηα)α




3 σ2(αη(α − 2)
2
− σ (2 − α)(1− α)





3 σ2(α2η(2 − α)
2
− σα(2 − α)(1− α)
2 − σ2 ¡






,s X = −
Φ
σ(1 − α)











2 σ2(−ση(1 − α)
2 (2(α − 2) − σ (1 − α))
− 2σ2 (1 − α)
3 + αη2 (2 − α)(σ +2− α))
sXY = Φ
(1 + σ)
σ2(1 − α)2α, sSY = Φ
³
σ(1 − α)






σ (1 − α)
2 + η
¡


















































α(η − 1)(1 − α) ˆ S2
= λY ˆ Y + λXY ˆ Y ˆ Y ∗ + λYYˆ Y 2 + λSY ˆ S ˆ Y + λSX ˆ S ˆ Y ∗ + λSS ˆ S2 + λYξˆ Y ˆ ξ
where











σ (1 − α)
+2
α









σ (1 − α)
−
1
σ2 (1 − α)





((1 − α)σ − η(2 − α))(ασ − σ +1 )α
(α − 1)









σ (1 − α)
− 4η
α2
σ2 (1 − α)
2 +2 η
α3







2 σ2(−ση(α − 1)
³
σ (α − 1)
2 − 4α(2 − α)
´
+ σ2 (3α − 1)(α − 1)



















ηα(2 − α)+σ(1 − α)
2
We have derived the general form for second-order approximation of the welfare function
(91), so substituting ˆ Ct from (106) into the part of (91) which depends on consumption, we










) ˆ C2 = µY ˆ Y +µXY ˆ Y ˆ Y ∗+µYYˆ Y 2+µSY ˆ S ˆ Y +µSX ˆ S ˆ Y ∗+µSS ˆ S2+µYξˆ Y ˆ ξ
where
µY = cY ,µ XY = cXY +
α(1 − σ)
σ(1 − α)
2,µ YY = cY 2 −
(1 − σ)
2σ (1 − α)
2,
µSY = cSY + η
α(1 − σ)(2− α)
σ (1 − α)
2 ,µ SX = cSX − η
α2 (2 − α)(1− σ)
σ(1 − α)
2 ,
µSS = cS2 −
1
2
η2α2 (2 − α)










βt−t0{CuC(C,1)[ ˆ Ct −
g
σ








− Yv y(Y,1)[ˆ Yt +
h
ψ









































t + µSY ˆ Stˆ Yt + µSX ˆ Stˆ Y ∗
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βt−t0κ(λY ˆ Yt + λXY ˆ Ytˆ Y ∗
t + λYYˆ Y 2
t + λSY ˆ Stˆ Yt + λSX ˆ Stˆ Y ∗
t + λSS ˆ S2













Now, we can eliminate linear term in Yt from Wt0 using expression for Vt0 :
















































































































= θVt0 − Yv y
∞ X
t=t0
βt−t0{νXYY tˆ Y ∗
t + νYYY 2
t + νSYStYt
+ νSXStˆ Y ∗
t + νSSS2







We now try to write the formula in gap variables. As shock ˆ ξ enters in quadratic terms only,
it is enough to use linear approximation to equilibrium condition in order to deﬁne natural rates,
see formula (105) and
ˆ ξ =
(ψ + σ(1 − α))
(ψ + σ)(1− α)










(ψ + σ)(1− α)
ˆ Y ∗n
Therefore:















ˆ St − ˆ Sn
t
´³
ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t
´
+ ˆ Yt((νSY −
ψασ(η(2 − α) − σ(1 − α))
(ψ + σ)σ(1 − α)
νYξ)ˆ Sn
t +( 2 νYY +
(ψ + σ(1 − α))




(ψ + σ)(1− α)
νYξ)ˆ Y ∗n)+ˆ St
³
2νSS ˆ Sn
t + νSY ˆ Y n





= θVt0 − Yv yW + tip(3)
where
W = A1(ˆ Y − ˆ Y n)2 + A2(ˆ S − ˆ Sn)2 + A3(ˆ S − ˆ Sn)(ˆ Y − ˆ Y n)
+ ˆ S(A41 ˆ Sn + A42 ˆ Y n + A43 ˆ Y ∗n)
+ ˆ Y (A51 ˆ Sn + A52 ˆ Y n + A53 ˆ Y ∗n)+B6π2
H
and
A1 = νYY,A 2 = νSS,A 3 = νSY,A 41 =2 νSS,A 43 = νSY,A 44 = νSX,
A51 = νSY −
ψασ(η(2 − α) − σ(1 − α))
(ψ + σ)σ(1 − α)
νYξ,A 52 =2 νYY +
(ψ + σ(1 − α))
(ψ + σ)(1− α)
νYξ,
A53 = νXY −
ψα
(ψ + σ)(1− α)
νYξ,A 6 = νππ.
33